In the context of globalized supply chains, counterfeiting of manufactured goods is a growing problem. The financial, legal, and reputational costs that counterfeit goods impose on legitimate enterprises have spurred investigation into efficient and robust anti-counterfeiting methodologies. In particular, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been applied effectively in several manufacturing areas, especially electronics. However, anti-counterfeiting solutions for generic manufactured goods are often expensive to make and implement, or not robust to minor damage that the goods may sustain during transport and use. In this paper, a framework for developing robust, efficient, and costeffective optical PUFs for anti-counterfeiting of manufactured metallic goods is proposed, along with an example implementation for 4140-steel parts according to standard ASTM A29. For an input library of 50 steel micrographs, the proposed example PUF is shown to have good robustness to simulated part damage and an estimated classification error rate of less than 1%.
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Introduction
In today's globalized design and manufacturing environment, it is almost cliché to point out that designers, part suppliers, and other personnel are often geographically dispersed, and that dozens of teams may be involved in the product realization process. However, it is also important to consider the opportunity this large network provides would-be counterfeiters. Indeed, manufactured good counterfeiting is a profitable illicit activity, and thrives in large supply networks where traceability and validation are difficult [1] .
The increased prevalence of counterfeiting among, for example, the automotive and pharmaceutical industries [2] , has spurred work in developing efficient, accurate, robust anticounterfeiting methods. There is an interesting design challenge in creating economically feasible, easy-to-implement anticounterfeiting schemes that are identifying, yet robust to the damage expected of mechanical components during transport and use. In particular, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been applied with success in several anti-counterfeiting scenarios, especially in detecting counterfeit electronics.
In this paper, a PUF formulation framework is proposed to address this challenge. In Section 2, a review of the relevant literature in anti-counterfeiting and PUF design is presented. In Section 3, a general PUF design framework is proposed for developing PUFs for use in manufactured goods anti-counterfeiting. In Section 4, this framework is applied to the design of a PUF protocol for 4140-steel (ASTM A29) parts. In Section 5, closing comments and thoughts on future work are presented.
Literature Review 2.1 Impact of Counterfeiting in Manufacturing
Counterfeiting in manufacturing is a growing problem around the world. Increasing numbers of counterfeit goods in the Department of Defense's supply chain [3] and the automotive and pharmaceutical industries [2, 4] , to cite a few, indicate the growing capability of counterfeiting enterprises to infiltrate supply chains with many modes of entry. The same trend has also motivated legal and technological investigation into addressing the issue.
Counterfeit manufactured goods may increase production costs, compromise product safety, and raise reputational and legal concerns for companies producing complex products. Unfortunately, the same trends that have allowed for the development of complex manufactured goods also play into the hands of counterfeiters: commonly cited reasons for increasing counterfeit activity include the rising prevalence of multinational corporations and geographically disparate product development teams [5] , the increasing ease of international trade, the rise of e-commerce, and increasing societal importance of complex supply chains with huge counterfeit infiltration attack surfaces [1, 6] . Thus, a key question arises for legitimate businesses participating in these product realization processes: how may counterfeit parts be detected throughout the process and during the product's lifetime in a cost-effective manner? In this paper, optical PUFs are proposed as a possible solution in general metallic part manufacturing.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
Physically unclonable functions, or PUFs, are functions applied to some input component, the challenge, that produce an output response that serves to identify the input as genuine or otherwise [7, 8] . In particular, it should be difficult for an attacker to determine the response a challenge should output without seeing the challenge first, regardless of the number of challengeresponse pairs the attacker may know. PUFs leverage inherent or externally introduced randomness of a part to generate a discriminating, yet robust, identifying string for that part. What constitutes adequate discrimination and robustness is a decision made by the entity implementing a PUF.
There is a need to extract randomness from a part and form some response that acts as an identifier for that part. This is similar to the "fuzzy extractor" methods used in biometrics and other cryptographic applications with noisy random sources [9, 10] , although without the error correction implied in fuzzy extractor schemes; indeed, a measure of difference between expected and realized response could encode not just identifying information, but information on damage sustained by the part, previous use, and other valuable information.
The most common PUFs involve evaluating integrated circuit (IC) responses to a given challenge [7] that vary randomly between instances of the IC. Such PUFs have varied operating principles, including, for example, measuring the spatially varying capacitance of a coating or the delay between different gates of an IC [11] . Optical PUF designs, for instance leveraging the random distribution of particles suspended in a transparent media as proposed by Pappu [8] , are also well-studied. Existing counterfeiting solutions in manufacturing all draw from the principles of PUFs. For instance, the use of physical attachments (e.g., RFID tags or holographic markers) for counterfeit detection [12] and paper-or packaging-based methods of counterfeit detection [13, 14] draw on IC-and optically-based PUF designs. Recent work has also pointed out the rising potential for nanoscale PUF development [15] .
In this paper, instance-specific surface analysis is proposed to extract the necessary randomness from instances of a metal part. Analysis of metal surfaces for anti-counterfeiting has shown some promise. For instance, Takahashi has shown the potential identifying characteristics of surface finish features [16] . Cao presented an analysis of microscopic responses to nanoscale features [17] . However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, a generalized framework for leveraging surface microstructural features of metallic parts for anti-counterfeiting has not been presented.
Contribution of This Paper
In this paper, a general framework for designing PUF protocols for anti-counterfeiting in metallic part manufacturing is proposed. In particular, this paper focuses on the design of optical PUFs which leverage the surface microstructural features of metallic goods as the underlying source of randomness used for identification.
PUF Design Framework for Manufactured Goods
In this section, a generalized framework for designing PUFs for manufactured goods is proposed. Although this paper focuses on the design of optical PUFs, this framework is intended to generalize to other classes of PUFs applied to manufactured goods when the goal is to identify counterfeits on a part instance level. Note that the driving motivation is to design PUF schemes that maximize the probability of detecting counterfeit (i.e., not enrolled) part instances during a challenge, while being robust to the damage the parts are expected to take during transport or use.
As discussed previously, PUFs leverage the intrinsic, unavoidable randomness between part instances that arise during the manufacturing process; a PUF transforms this randomness into a robust method for determining the identity of a part being challenged later in time. A well-designed PUF will have the qualities proposed by Maes and Verbauwhede [11] , namely evaluability, uniqueness, reproducibility, unclonability, unpredictability, one-wayness, and tamper evidence. To best achieve these qualities, the PUF designer must take care to study the performance of a proposed PUF scheme, primarily through (i) experimental data collection, (ii) structure idealization for feature analysis, and (iii) PUF formulation for implementation, as presented in Figure 1 .
In this section, general concerns are discussed for each of these categories, with mathematical details specified for general PUF formulation. An example implementation is discussed in Section 4.
Key Definitions
To discuss PUF formulation in more detail, it is first necessary to clarify key term definitions, as used in this paper: 
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF):
A function that applies some challenge to a part, which yields a response that identifies the part as genuine or counterfeit [11] . In this paper, PUFs Π(i) are considered which, given a challenge instance, genuine or otherwise, apply some function and respond with a representation of that instance, b i , that may be used to determine the instance's authenticity. This output is constructed using some features of the input instance. Note that a PUF should be "easy" to apply to the input, but it should be "difficult" to predict the output, and "ease" and "difficulty" should be quantifiable in some sense. 3. Enrollment: The process by which each part instance i is passed through the PUF, with its response b i recorded, tied to instance i, and saved by the manufacturer. 4. Challenge: The process by which the manufacturer or a customer passes a suspect part instance C, which may or may not be a genuine part instance, through the PUF with the intention of determining C's authenticity by comparing C's PUF response to the expected challenge response enrolled by the manufacturer.
With these definitions in place, the key aspects of PUF design follow below.
Experimental Data Collection
In order to evaluate a PUF formulation, it is necessary to quantify, in some sense, how well that formulation will perform. Thus the designer should collect data from parts of interest to study PUF performance and change the design if necessary. This may include analyzing the effect of material preprocessing if collecting micrographs or other surface features, the reproducibility of certain features between instances of the same manufacturing batch or instances from different batches, the ease with which an adversary could reproduce a feature critical to the PUF, and the effects damage profiles have on PUF feature responses over time.
Practical concerns are also important. For instance, a PUF designer should keep in mind ease of data collection during PUF application, expense to the manufacturer when enrolling parts or to the customer when challenging a suspect part, and the upkeep requirements of the scheme if new hardware/software is needed to carry out the PUF protocol.
Finally, the designer should use experimental data available from potential part instances to explore relevant features to extract given the available sampling tools, the capabilities of the manufacturer and/or customers, and the randomness that is natural to the parts or that could be introduced during manufacturing.
Structure Idealization
It is also useful to leverage physics-based models to generate simulated instance data, in order to generate large volumes of simulated data quickly. This would be helpful when studying the statistics of some feature response without collecting large volumes of experimental data, often at a large expense of time and money. Idealization may also be useful when a PUF designer wishes to evaluate the fitness of features before gathering experimental data to reduce the number of experiments to run, or as a supplement to existing experimental data. Such mathematical/physical models could be used to simulate the effects of damage during licit use, the evolution of relevant microstructural features during manufacturing, or other qualities of interest to a given PUF design.
Although structural idealization is a helpful step in PUF design, it does involve generating models accurate enough to give realistic data for the features of interest. As the goal of this paper is to introduce the general formulation and provide a realistic implementation example, idealization is not discussed further here.
PUF Formulation
PUF formulation involves the complete specification of a PUF design Π that maps a discriminating, robust string b i to a genuine instance i of a manufactured good. That is, formulate PUF Π(i) that outputs a string b i such that it is likely that the same part instance at a later time, i, perhaps damaged in a way anticipated by the experimental and idealized data analysis, yields a similar string b i b i , but that it is also likely to generate a highly dissimilar string when applied to an instance j = i. In this subsection, notation is developed for formalizing PUF designs in the general case. Notation and formulation. First, recall that a PUF Π(i) is some function that takes as input an instance i of a part, and outputs an identifying string b i for that instance, Π(i) = b i , which is used to classify the part as genuine or counterfeit. This process requires:
1. a procedure Γ(i) for extracting some feature vector v i from i, such that v i = Γ(i), 2. a map g(v i ) that outputs a string b i from the feature vector, such that b i = g(v i ), 3. a metric H(b C , b i ), denoted H for simplicity, quantifying the dissimilarity between a challenge response string b C and an enrolled response string b i , and 4. a decision rule Λ(H) that classifies a challenge instance C as genuine (C = i) or counterfeit (C = j) based on the dissimilarity H of response string b C and enrolled string b i .
Thus the complete PUF formulation is constructed by specifying first the string construction method given i,
and then specifying the decision rule for classifying any
Application. Constructing Γ(i) requires specifying all aspects of feature extraction. In the optical case, for instance, Γ(i) incorporates image capture, material pre-processing (if any), image pre-processing (if any), and the algorithms used for extracting relevant features from the images. Since v i is not intended to be stored, the size of v i is generally not a major concern. However, the evaluation time of Γ(i) may be important if being applied to, say, an assembly line in real-time.
Constructing g(v i ) requires specifying some map of v i to the string b i in a way that each instance is highly likely to produce a unique string with respect to other instances from the same manufacturing line, but that the string is robust to expected part damage. Since b i , the enrolled string, will be stored, minimizing the size of b i may be important; thus analyzing the trade-off between string length and discrimination/robustness may be important in the experimental data collection and structure idealization phases of PUF design.
H(b C , b i ) should be constructed to properly capture the feature encoding of g(v i ). For instance, some bits in b i , if different in b C , may encode a greater dissimilarity between C and i; in this case H should account for this difference. So, the construction of H is highly dependent on how the designer chooses to construct Γ(i) and g(v i ) and should be designed to minimize the classification error of Λ(H).
PUF Evaluation
Given sets of possible Γ, g, H, and Λ for some implementation scenario, the problem becomes choosing a combination for the PUF formulation. Here, several PUF evaluation concerns are important. A PUF designer would choose the Γ, g, H, and Λ that best meets their most relevant concerns, subject to any constraints they may have. Such concerns include: In the following section, an example PUF formulation is provided to illustrate this methodology and how these concerns may manifest in practice.
Application to 4140-Steel Parts
In this section, a PUF formulation is developed for anticounterfeiting of 4140-steel parts. The PUF takes as input a challenge instance C of the steel part, computes the resulting string b C , and then compares this string to the instance's enrolled string b i computed at enrollment time. For this analysis, it is assumed that micrographs serve as the raw inputs from each instance i to the PUF.
Defining Γ(i): Data Collection
A 4140/4142 alloy steel rod, with composition according to standard ASTM A29, was sectioned perpendicular to its major axis, polished, and etched via submersion in a 5% nital solution for 30 seconds. 50 micrographs were taken at different locations on the etched sample surface for use in this analysis as the initial enrolled instances. Each micrograph was captured using an AmScope MU500 5.1MP digital camera at 200X magnification. An example micrograph is provided in Figure 2 ; note the distinct proeutectoid ferrite (bright) and pearlite (dark) phases, which serve as the primary source of randomness leveraged in this PUF formulation.
Defining Γ(i): Image Pre-Processing
The micrographs were pre-processed using the open source image processing software, ImageJ Fiji [18] . Each micrograph was converted to an 8-bit greyscale image and then blurred using Guassian blurring (σ = 2 pixels) to remove excess noise and noticeable lamellae in the pearlite phase. The pre-processing procedure is illustrated in Figure 3 . The histograms of pixel intensities for the processed micrographs were leveraged to re-classify all pixels in the blurred image as belonging to one of four phases ρ = {ρ 0 , ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 }: the dark pearlite phase ρ 0 (which appears as a dark phase at this magnification with a small Guassian blur), the bright proeutectoid ferrite phase ρ 3 , and two intermediate phases ρ 1 and ρ 2 that characterize the transition between the bright and dark phases in the post-processed micrographs. These intermediate phases were defined as those pixels lying within 10 intensity (where for each pixel, the 8-bit intensity I ∈ [0, 2 8 − 1]) of the first histogram peak, and those lying above 10 intensity of the first peak and 20 intensity below the second peak. This was done to more con- fidently distinguish between the pearlite and ferrite phases, as well as normalize for any illumination changes that may occur between image capture in practice. An illustration of this pixel classification scheme is given in Figure 4 . An example of a micrograph after pixel classification is given in Figure 5 .
Defining Γ(i): PUF Feature Extraction
Four image slices corresponding to the four pixel classification phases were taken from each processed micrograph. An illustration of the resulting micrograph slices is given in Figure  6 . From each image slice, mean phase intercept length L 3,ρ n and phase volume fraction V ρ n statistics were taken from individual quad-tiled regions of interest (ROIs) following the tiling protocol presented in our earlier work [19] with four levels of recursion. These responses were used to generate instance feature vectors v i . The feature vector for this formulation has the form
where r ∈ R denotes ROI r in the set R of all ROI's taken from i's micrograph. Since there are four phases for each micrograph, and as in [19] there are 85 ROI's taken per micrograph, |v i | = |R| × |ρ| × 2 = 680 feature entries per micrograph. Phase Intercept Length Extraction. The phase intercept length calculation follows from the lineal analysis approach given in [19] for a brass PUF. To each micrograph slice, apply m uniformly distributed, randomly oriented test lines, each having length L k , 1 ≤ k ≤ m. The mean intercept length is given by Tomkeieff's Equation [20] using the normalized intercept count N L ,
where P k is the number of on-phase-off-phase intersection points on line L k , and |L k | is the length of L k . For each micrograph slice considered, m = 1, 200 lines were applied with random lengths and orientations. The mean three-dimensional intercept length L 3,ρ n for the given micrograph slice is then
This calculation was done for each ROI of each micrograph, for each pixel phase slice. Volume Fraction Extraction. Lineal analysis also allows for the calculation of mean volume fraction. For each of the m lines L k≤m , let |L k,ρ n | be the length of L k falling on phase ρ n ∈ ρ. Then the volume fraction of phase ρ n , V ρ n , in the ROI under consideration is
This calculation was done for each ROI of each micrograph, for each pixel phase slice.
Defining g(v i ): PUF Bit String Construction
Given v i , it remains to specify b i = g(v i ). In the naïve case, one could take v i directly; that is, g(v i ) = v i , or even simply take the complete micrograph. However, as b i must be stored by the original manufacturer, or some other organization contracted by the manufacturer, there is an incentive to minimize the length of b i . To this end, here g(v i ) is specified such that the L 3,ρ n and V ρ n feature responses for each ROI, for each phase ρ n ∈ ρ of i's micrograph, contribute only one bit to b i . This is done by comparing each feature response to the median of all responses for that phase of that micrograph, as in Algorithm 1. Note that, if a manufacturer desires a shorter b i , not all features or phases need be passed to Algorithm 1. Indeed, in the analysis presented in this paper, cases where only phase ρ 0 , phase ρ 3 , phases {ρ 0 , ρ 3 }, and all phases ρ are analyzed.
Generating Challenge Instances C
For each micrograph, b i was found from v i using Algorithm 1 for each case discussed above. To test the robustness of this method, simulated damage was applied to each of the micrographs in the form of dark striations. Increasing damage severity was modeled as increasing amounts of striations. An example of such a "damaged" micrograph is provided in Figure 7 . Pixels lying in these striations were assumed to be easily masked out of a micrograph and not considered when taking pixel intensity histograms for pixel classification as in Figure 4 .
Damage profiles included 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 striations applied to each of the raw micrographs at random locations. Thus, for each micrograph corresponding to an instance i, there were 5 challenge instances C that represented genuine but damaged instances i. All other instances in the library of micrographs were taken as counterfeit instances j that did not correspond to i.
Defining H b C , b i : String Distances
The distance function H is defined between two strings b i and b C using a modified Hamming distance metric as in our previous work [19] , but extended to account for an arbitrary feature vector extracted from the instance during the PUF protocol. Recall that for each enrolled instance i and challenge instance C, we generate strings b i and b C . For strings b i and b C of length L and
for r in R do / * compare each ROI feature value to median over all ROIs Example of a processed micrograph after 12 striations were applied to the raw micrograph to simulate damage. [19] , the proposed string distance function H is given by
where q (b i ) n , (b C ) n , k n is the bit-wise comparison function on the bit string entries, k n is the corresponding ROI recursion level of entry n, 0 ≤ k n ≤ K, and ∑
Note that in this case, K = 3 total recursion levels. Also note that H is defined in such a way that dissimilar bits corresponding to features gathered from larger ROIs by area are penalized more heavily than those gathered from smaller ROIs. H = 0 implies perfect agreement between b i and b C , while H → 1 implies increasing dissimilarity between b i and b C .
Defining Λ(H): Challenge Instance Classification
Now for any enrolled instance i and challenge instance C, a distance H may be calculated between them. From these distances, a simple one-feature likelihood ratio function Λ(H) may be applied to classify the challenge as genuine or counterfeit. That is, letting C = i indicate a genuine but possibly damaged challenge instance and C = j indicate a counterfeit challenge instance, and assuming both events are equally likely a priori,
where p(H|C = i) and p(H|C = j) are the probability density functions of the distance H given a genuine and counterfeit part instance, respectively. To generate functional forms for these density functions, it is necessary to generate training data. Here, the experimentally gathered micrographs and their corresponding strings are used for this training. Call all distances H(b C ||b i ,C = j) the interdistances between different enrolled instances, and all distances H(b C ||b i ,C = i) the intra-distances between an enrolled instance i and the same instance after simulated damage is applied. Functional forms of p(H|C = j) and p(H|C = i) were found by fitting the experimentally determined inter-and intra-distances to normal and log-normal distributions, respectively. Specifically, it is assumed that
where µ and σ were found by fitting the experimental interdistances, with no applied damage, to p(H|C = j), and
where the shape parameter σ and scale parameter s were found by fitting the experimental intra-distances to p(H|C = i) for each damage severity considered.
To estimate the probability of classification error, note that C is mis-classified if β = Λ(H) does not match C's identity (C = j, β = i, or C = i, β = j). Also note that, since this classification is done via a likelihood ratio, for the given training data there will be a threshold H = τ such that H ≤ τ ⇒ β = i, and H > τ ⇒ β = j. Thus the estimated probability of error, P(error), is given by
where as before, P(C = j) and P(C = i) are both assumed to be 0.5 a priori.
Implementation and Results
Inter-and intra-distance plots derived from strings constructed using individual pearlite and ferrite phase data, pearlite and ferrite phase data combined, and all phase data combined are given in Figure 8 . Note that while the distance plots for the strings constructed utilizing data from multiple phases show greater separation, and therefore imply greater confidence in classifying a challenge part instance as genuine or counterfeit, these strings are longer than the strings derived from the data of individual phases.
The probability of error for strings constructed using various phase data, along with the string sizes and fitted parameters for the distributions of inter-and intra-distances, for each damage profile are summarized in Table 1 . Note that the probability of error increases with increased damage (i.e., more striations applied) for all construction methods considered. This is an intuitive result, indicating that there is a higher probability of mis-classification with greater difference between i and i's micrograph.
The estimated probability of error for the case where all phases are considered when constructing b i is the lowest across all damage profiles as expected, although this comes at the cost of more data per instance to store in the form of the enrolled string. Interestingly, the ferrite phase construction out-performs the ferrite-and-pearlite construction for the 4-and 20-striation damage cases with respect to error probability, indicating that A B D C FIGURE 8. Inter-and intra-distance histogram plots and the fitted distributions for strings constructed using (A) pearlite phase data, (B) ferrite phase data, (C) data from both pearlite and ferrite phases but not the intermediate phases, and (D) data from all four pixel phases. The intra-distance histograms for various damage severities (prominent at low bit string distances H) are fitted to log-Normal distributions, while the inter-distance histograms are fitted to normal distributions.
including pearlite phase information may in fact be introducing confusion into the string construction. This highlights the interdependence between features, expected damage, and string construction that must be studied before committing to a PUF formulation. This also emphasizes the need to study the discriminatory ability of each feature, with respect to damage and other legitimate instances, before committing to a PUF formulation. Of course, the expected damage here is simulated, so the results here may differ from results collected on samples damage by experiment or in practice.
A manufacturer should study the trade-off between string length, discriminatory ability, and robustness to a given damage profile carefully when choosing formulations for Γ(i), g(v i ), H, and Λ(H). Analyses with respect to different extracted features, damage profiles, and string constructions that proceed similarly to the method presented in this Section would inform designers on the most appropriate PUF formulation for a given scenario. 
Conclusion
In any anti-counterfeiting scenario, PUF design should be tailored to the situation at hand. Still, given a class of PUF designs, such as optical PUFs, and a class of implementation scenarios, commonalities should be leveraged. In this paper, a general framework for designing PUF protocols for anticounterfeiting in manufacturing is proposed, with an emphasis on developing optical PUFs that leverage surface microstructural information. This framework was applied to design an optical PUF for 4140-steel parts that leverages phase information to generate discriminating bit strings as identifiers that are robust to scratching damage the part may sustain. The applicability of the method is demonstrated by applying the PUF to a library of 50 4140-steel micrographs and applying simulated scratching damage to generate "challenges" occurring later in time. Better results, in terms of minimal expected classification error, are obtained by considering more features when constructing the identifying bit strings, at the cost of more required storage space per enrolled part instance. Alternatively, more challenge-response pairs can be used per instance, improving results (also at the expense of more storage per enrolled instance).
Limitations of the analysis presented here include (i) PUF application to only one material, 4140-steel, (ii) application of simulated damage profiles, instead of damage profiles gathered through experimentation, and (iii) analysis using samples with similar surface preparation, which may not always be applicable in manufacturing contexts. Still, this analysis represents a modest step towards a discriminating-yet-robust PUF design framework that may be applied to a wide range of metals and expected damage profiles, and as an example implementation of the more general framework presented in Section 3.
In future work, this PUF design framework should be applied to new materials and classes of PUFs leveraging different surface characteristics of part instances. Also, effort should be made to expand the library of potential features that would be useful when enhancing discriminatory ability, robustness to particular damage types, or ability to apply similar PUFs to different materials. Studies into the performance of various features under specific damage profiles would also help PUF designers when selecting features to include in a PUF formulation in practice.
